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1. Interest as Damages Distinguished from Contractual Interest.
"Interest" is compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties
for the use or detention of money,' or allowed by law as additional
damages for loss of the use of money due as damages during the lapse
of time since the accrual of the claim. It is customarily computed as
a certain annual percentage of the principal sum or claim. For our
present purposes a sharp distinction must be taken between interest
which is agreed to be paid as one of the terms of a contract, and in-
terest not based on promise but given by law for the withholding of
money or compensation due. Questions often arise as to the effect,
interpretation and validity of promises to pay interest, but they are
not questions of the law of damages, and we are not primarily con-
cerned with them here, but will direct our attention to interest allowed
as damages. The two types of interest, the "conventional ' 2 or prom-
ised interest on the one hand, and interest as damages, on the other,
are similar in result, and shade into each other along their border
line. For example, is interest allowed after maturity upon a note
which bears interest "from date," based upon an implicit promise to
pay such interest, or upon a duty to pay damages for breach of the
promise to pay at maturity? Usually, however, the difference in
origin of the two kinds of interest is readily discernible, and it is of
practical importance to distinguish them. Upon such distinction may
depend, for example, whether the interest to be allowed shall be at
one rate or anfother,3 whether the interest is allowable as of right or
* This article will form the basis of a chapter in an elementary textbook
on Damages, which will be published by the West Publishing Company, St.
Paul, Minn.
** Dean and Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'Kishi v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 10 F. (2d) 356, 357 (C. C. A., 5th, 1926).
CAL. CiV. CODE (Deering, 1927) §1915, contains this definition which has been
embodied in many other codes: "Interest is the compensation allowed for the
use, or forbearance, or detention of money, or its equivalent." This definition,
like most others in the decisions and statutes, is defective in ignoring interest
allowed as compensation for delay in satisfying unliquidated claims.
'See Bell v. Gerlach, 205 S. W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
Thus, where a note bears interest at a certain rate until its due date, but
is silent as to the rate of interest to be paid thereafter, is a promise to be in-
ferred to pay interest at the same rate after as before maturity, or is the
interest after maturity allowable only as damages, and at the legal rate? The
authorities are divided on the question; see Holden v. Freedmens' Savings etc.
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in the jury's discretion, 4 or whether the interest claimed shall be in-
cluded in the sum by which the jurisdiction of the particular court is
fixed.5
2. Historical Development of the Modern Law as to Interest.
The history of interest in English law is a curious chapter in the
story of the adjustment of law to changing social and economic de-
mands.8 In a primitive agricultural society, the borrowers of money
are chiefly those who are weak and necessitous and thus are exposed
to the over-reaching of the shrewd and unscrupulous. In this early
pastoral stage, the highest ethical standards enjoined the giving of
charity to those in need, or at least the making of gratuitous loans,
and frowned upon the taking of recompense for lending to the needy.
Since the needy were the only borrowers, the practice of "usury"-
receiving any recompense for money lent-was condemned outright.
Thus Plato7 and Aristotle8 in Greece regarded lending on interest as
unworthy, and Moses9 invoked the sanction of religion against the
practice. Philosophy and religion were reinforced by the power of
a sounding metaphor, "money cannot breed money."10 The Christian
church zealously espoused this moral concept and throughout the
medieval period the canon law absolutely forbade the receipt by
Co., 100 U. S. 72, 25 L. ed. 567 (1879) (legal rate governs in District of Colum-
bia), and Ohio v. Frank, 103 U. S. 697, 26 L. ed. 531 (1880) (contractual rate
governs in Illinois), and cases collected in DECENNIAL DIGESTS, "Interest,"
§37 (1).
' See §§6 and 7 of this article.
'Thus where a justice's court was limited in its jurisdiction to cases in-
volving "$200 or less, exclusive of interest," an action to recover $200 obtained
from plaintiff by fraud, with interest thereon as damages, was not within the
jurisdictional limit, .which referred to contractual interest and not to interest
as damages. McElroy v. Industrial Petroleum Co., 260 S. W. 693, 694 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924).
'Sir W. S. Holdsworth in the eighth volume of his HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW (2d ed. 1926) 100-112 tells in an illuminating way the absorbing story of
the evolution of the medieval law of usury. From this the above text is chiefly
derived. In H. H. L. Bellott's BARGAINS WITH MONEY LENDERS, chapter 1
(1906) is to be found a resum6 and comparison of early moral ideas about
usury in various countries. Mr. Justice Porter's opinion in Marshall v. Beeler,
104 Kan. 32, 178 Pac. 245 (1919) gives a short and sprightly account of the
history of usury.
'Treatise de Legibus, v. 742, cited Bellott, op. cit. supra note 6, at c. 11.
'POLITICS, 1, 4, 23.
'EXODUS, XXII, 25: "If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor
by thee, thou shalt not be to him as a usurer, neither shall thou lay upon him
usury." But compare the practice as revealed by the reproach to the slothful
servant in the parable of the talents: "Thou oughtest therefore to have put
my money to the exchangers, and then at my coming I should have received
mine own with usury." (MATTHEW, xxv, 27.)
S"A breed of barren metal" (MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 1, scene 3).
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Christians of recompense for the lending of money. To this prohi-
bition is traced the emergence of the Jews to a position of power as
money lenders. By the end of the medieval period, however, mer-
cantile and industrial enterprise had come to assume an ever increas-
ingly important share in the economic system of Europe. A practice
which was oppressive and extortionate when applied to the poor peas-
ant borrower was helpful and stimulating to trade, when applied to
the merchant seeking to finance the sale of his wares abroad. In the
face of this economic demand, church and state were powerless to
prevent the commercial borrower from bargaining for money that he
needed and could only get by offering an inducement in return.
Among the many inventions to which this necessity gave birth was
the idea, apparently indigenous in the Roman law,1 1 that while re-
compense for the mere lending is "usury," yet if a loan be made
gratuitously but is not repaid promptly according to the agreement,
then a recompense may properly be exacted for the lender's losses
actually suffered or gains prevented, by the borrower's default in com-
plying with his promise. This compensation for the difference be-
tween the lender's position after default and what it would have been
if the bargain had been fulfilled, was called "interest" (id quod inter-
est, "that which is between") and its collection was approved by
Aquinas and the canonists of the later medieval period.' 2 We shall
see that this exactly corresponds to the allowance of interest as dam-
ages for breach of contract in present day common law.
By the sixteenth century the gap between legal and religious the-
ory on the one hand, and commercial practice on the other, was ready
to be bridged by a redefinition of terms which should make possible
a restatement of the law. It could by then be seen that the real evil was
not the taking of payment for the lending of money, but taking such
payment in an extortionate or unconscionable amount.13 Melancthon
and Calvin threw the weight of the new Protestant ethical system to
the support of the mercantile practice of bargaining for loans, and
though the word "usury" retained its age-old stigma, it changed its
content and, as transformed, came to mean exclessive exactions for
" J. M. Landis, "Usury." THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITrANICA (14th ed.,
1929).
' Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 6, at 103.
13 Compare Bacon's later observations: "... two things are to be reconciled:
The one that the tooth of usurie be grinded, that it bite note too much; the
other that there be left open a meanes to invite moneyed men to lend to the
merchants for the continuing and quickening of trade" (EssAY ON USURY).
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the use of money. Legally, this progress was halting and timorous.
A statute of 154514 condemned "usury" as of yore, but exempted
those who charged no more than ten per cent from the penalties of
usury. In 1551-5215 this statute was repealed as too radical, but in
1571 it was revived. In the next century successive statutes reduced
the maximum rate from ten to eight, and finally to five per cent. By
the nineteenth century, however, the reaction from the abhorrence of
the taking of any interest had swung to the opposite extreme and,
under the influence of Bentham, 16 the economists came to believe that
there should be absolute free trade in money and in 1854 secured
from Parliament 17 the repeal of the usury laws. This left as the only
curb upon extortionate interest, the somewhat shadowy authority of
courts of equity to decline to enforce oppressive bargains of every
sort.' 8 This extreme liberalization proved equally as impracticable
as regards loans to needy individuals as the ancient prohibition of
usury had been in respect to loans in aid of commercial enterprise.
Consequently, in 1900,19 1911,20 and 192721 various Money-lender's
Acts were passed in England which subjected loans for personal
needs to control by the courts, not by a maximum limit, but by an
undefined authority to prevent oppressive exactions.
The reception of English law in America came at the stage when
by statute a maximum rate was fixed, and this method of control has
been adhered to by nearly all the states. The statutes usually provide
for a maximum rate of interest, beyond which is unlawful usury,
and usually for a smaller "legal" rate which applies in the absence
of specific agreement. Even in the Uniform Small Loans Act a
specific maximum of 32 per cent per month is fixed, and the ad-
vantages of a definite limit are obvious.
We have seen from the foregoing that the great struggle from
ancient through medieval times has been over the power to agree or
contract for the payment of interest for the use of money, and that
only at the Reformation did the differentiation of reasonable bar-
gaining for compensation for money borrowed, from harsh and ex-
" 37 HENRY VIII, C. 9.
" 5, 6, EDWARD VI, c. 20.
"DEFENCE OF USURY (1787).
" 17, 18 VICTORIA, c. 90.
'See Chesterfield v. Janssen, 1 Atk. 339, 26 Eng. Rep. 191 (1750) ; Earl of
Aylesford v. Morris (1883) L. R. 8, Ch. 484, HOLDSWORTH, op. Cit. sispra note
6, at 111.
63 and 64 VICToRIA, c. 51.
1 and 2 GEORGE V, c. 38.
17 and 18 GEORGE V, c. 21.
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tortionate exactions for such loans, finally became translated into
law. We have noted that one liberalizing idea was the recognition of
the justice of compensating the creditor by way of damages for loss
of the use of his money if not repaid as agreed. Nevertheless, this
notion of allowing interest as damages, imported from Rome, was
itself slow in securing practical application by the common law courts
even after the enforcement of promises to pay interest had been
sanctioned by statute. The stigma of religious and moral taboos,
inherited from the dark era of prohibition, remained to stunt and
distort the growth of all branches of the legal rules about compen-
sation for delay in paying money or damages. This ancient prejudice
has been singularly unfortunate in restricting the rational develop-
ment of the practice of allowing interest as damages. The ancient
evil of unconscionable extortion is wholly absent where the interest
is to be exacted by a court and not by a money lender. While there
are some early expressions in the English decisions2 2 which would
indicate that interest was to be allowed as damages for the non-pay-
ment of every debt, yet by the end of the eighteenth century the com-
mon law courts bad accepted the view that interest as damages as
distinguished from promises to pay interest, express or inferred from
conduct or usage, could only be allowed upon a contract for payment
of money on a day certain, such as a note or bill of exchange, and
seemingly then only in the jury's discretion.2s This was only slightly
extended by Lord Tenderden's Act2 4 in 1833 which provided that the
jury "may, if they shall think fit," allow interest (a) upon written
promises to pay sums certain in money at a definite time, from the
day fixed, or (b) in case of other promises to pay certain sums from
the date of written demand, specifically claiming interest, and (c) in
actions of trover and trespass for taking personal property. In a
comparatively recent case 25 the House of Lords considered that in-
terest on debts generally as damages for their detention ought to be,
but is not, allowable at common law, and criticised the statute as too
narrow for the purposes of justice. Interest as damages at law as dis-
tinguished from the chancery doctrines which we shall later consider,
' For example, in Sweatland v. Squire, 2 Salk. 623, 91 Eng. Rep. 527
(1699). See opinion of Savage, C. J., in Reid v. Rensselaer Glass Factory, 3
Cow. 393 (N. Y. 1824), CRANE, CASES oN DAMAGES (1928) 307, which gives a
review of the early cases in both countries.
' Eddowes v. Hopkins, 1 Douglas 373, 99 Eng. Rep. 242 (1780).
"3 and 4 WILLTAm IV, c. 42. (THE CIMi PRoCEDuRE AcT, 1833).
' London, Chatham and Dover Ry. Co. v. South Eastern Ry. Co., L. R.
(1893) A. C. 429, 437, 440.
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has had as is manifest, an abortive development in England. Since
the allowance of such damages has been so largely reposed in the
discretion of juries, legal rules on the subject have not been worked
out there as completely as in this country.
In America where perhaps traditional theology was not so domi-
nant, and mercantile influence was stronger, the courts have from the
first manifested a somewhat less intransigent attitude toward the
extension of the limits of the recovery of interest as damages. It
seems early to have been held that in any case of an obligation to pay
a definite, fixed sum of money whether arising from contract or
from a wrongful acquisition or detention of another's funds, interest
should be allowed as damages for the withholding.20 The subse-
quent course of the doctrine has been toward the extension of the
doctrine to claims for unliquidated amounts, at first in the English
form of a permission to the jury to find interest if they should see
fit, and later as a matter of right. The tendency is further to relax
the rule giving interest as damages only for withholding sums cer-
tainly ascertainable, and to regulate the matter by rule rather than
discretion, and to confide in the jury's caprice only the allowance of
interest on the outer fringe of claims least definable and predictable as
to amount. This evolution Sedgwick epitomizes as follows: "The
gradual extension of the principles allowing interest as damages is
clear. Beginning with a denial of interest in any case except where
it was allowed by contract, the law first gave discretion to the jury
to give interest as damages, and then allowed it as a matter of law
in a constantly increasing number of cases. This has led the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina 27 to say:
'Although it28 has not in cases like this yet been defined by clearly
cut rules, and has therefore usually been left to the discretion of a
jury, yet in the progress of the law as a science it must and will be so
defined; and the question in what cases interest shall be allowed, and
in what not, will be recognized as properly coming within the duty of
judicial instruction, just as the question of the measure of damages
now is, although until recently questions of that sort were considered
too versatile and various to admit of being governed by certain prin-
ciples, and were left, necessarily as was supposed, to the discretion
of a jury.' "29
Reid v. Rensslaer Glass Co., supra note 22.
'Rodman, J., in Lewis v. Rountree, 79 N. C. 122, 128 (1878).
:a That is, the allowance of interest.
1 SFDGWicv, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) §297.
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An attempt will be made in the following sections of this chapter
to outline the present state of the decisions in this country on the
more important aspects of the subject.
3. Rate at Which Interest Allowed as Damages.
Just as in the case when interest is agreed to be paid but no rate
is named, so also when interest is awarded as damages at law it is
allowed at the "legal" rate fixed by statute2 0 Consequently, a writ-
ten promise to pay money at a certain date without interest, if
breached by failure to pay, will carry interest as damages at the
statutory rate after maturity.3 1 If the statutory rate is changed after
the cause of action accrues, the interest should be allowed at the old
rate before, and at the new after, the altering enactment takes
effect.
3 2
In claims of equitable origin for the recovery of funds the courts
seem not to confine themselves invariably to the legal rate in allowing
interest as compensation, but to take into consideration the amount
which the custodian has earned.
33
4. Compound Interest.
Compound interest has such possibilities of accumulation that the
courts are averse to it.34 Even contracts to pay compound interest
are usually denied validity, though they are not per se usurious.3 5
However, in mutual or running accounts an express agreement, or
one implied from custom, to strike a balance including accrued inter-
est at annual rest periods as long as the account is current, is en-
1 1 SEDGwICic, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) §324a; DECENNIAL DIGESTS, "Inter-
est," §31.
Gale v. Corey, 112 Ind. 39, 13 N. E. 108, 14 N. E. 362 (1887).
" Saling v. Bolander, 125 Fed. 701 (C. C. A. 9th, 1903) ; Reese v. Ruther-
ford, 90 N. Y. 644 (1882).
' Pryor v. City of Buffalo, 113 N. Y. Supp. 249, 61 Misc. Rep. 162, modi-
fied 118 N. Y. Supp. 1136, 134 App. Div. 911, affirmed 197 N. Y. 123, 90 N. E.
423 (1909) (where the vendor deposits the purchase price in a trust company
at 4% and the purchaser suing to cancel ties up the funds, on securing a de-
cree for the return of the money he was allowed only 4% interest and not the
statutory rate of 6%).
" See generally 1 SEIxDWIcK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) §§343-346; DECENNIAL
DIGESTS, "Interest," §§58, 60.
Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162, 23 Am. Rep. 99 (1876); Bowman v. Neely,
151 Ill. 37, 37 N. E. 840 (1894) ; CRANE, CASES ON DAMAGES (1928) 322; 3
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §1417. Apparently in some states the recent
tendency is to permit parties to contract for compound interest. Musser v.
Murphy, 286 Pac. 618 (Idaho, 1930) Yemble; Palm v. Fancher, 93 Miss. 785,
48 So. 818, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 395 (1909) with note on "Validity of Agree-
ment Made before Interest Becomes Due to Pay Interest on Interest"; and see
Note (1925) 37 A. L. R. 327.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
forced,36 and renewal notes embodying the balance of principal and
accrued interest, and providing for interest upon the total are valid.
8 7
Naturally then, in view of the courts' hostility to compound in-
terest even by agreement, when they come to assess interest as dam-
ages, only simple interest and not compound is allowed.38 However,
if the installments of interest upon a bond or note are represented
by coupons which may be detached and separately negotiated, inter-
est upon these coupons is allowed as upon distinct commercial instru-
ments.3 9 Likewise, in about one-half the states, when instead of
mere general provisions such as "with six per cent interest" the in-
strument names specific times for the payment of installments of
interest before maturity, interest as damages may be allowed on these
installments from their due dates.40 Whether covered by coupons or
by such latter provision, it is only simple interest upon the install-
ment that is allowed, without further compounding. An exception to
the rule against compounding interest as damages exists in the flex-
ible equity practice, according to which compound interest may be
allowed where exceptional circumstances make it necessary for a just
accounting,4 1 or by way of preventing a fiduciary from reaping a
profit from a breach of trust.
42
"Boise v. Talcott, 264 Fed. 61 (C. C. A. 2nd., 1920) (agreement that in-
terest on an account- between a principal and factor, should be charged on
monthly balances, in which interest was included). See cases collected in Note,
"Annual Rests on Book Accounts," (1920) 5 A. L. R. 551. In New York,
however, it was held that an agreement in advance that interest should be
charged on an account current meant simple interest as an advance agreement
to compound the interest would be invalid, though later agreements for interest
on interest, after the accrual of the interest, as by accounts stated would be
effectual if based on consideration. Newburger-Morris Co. v. Talcott, 219
N. Y. 505, 114 N. E. 846, 3 A. L. R. 287 (1916).
" Musser v. Murphy, supra note 35.
' Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U. S. 476, 46 Sup. Ct. 428, 70
L. ed. 694 (1926); Blanchard v. Dominion N. Bank, 130 Va. 633, 108 S. E.
649, 27 A. L. R. 78 (1921).
'Parker v. McGintry, 77 Colo. 458, 239 Pac. 10 (1925); and see Note
(1923) 27 A. L. R. 89 et seq. Statutes sometimes prevent this result. Kessler
v. Kuhnle, 176 Mo. App. 397 (1913) ; First Savings & Trust Co. v. Cayenoira
& S. C. Ry. Co., 159 Wis. 344, 150 N. W. 405 (1915). And in any event, the
obligor should be able to defeat recovery of interest on the coupon by showing
his readiness to pay at maturity and continuously since. Hamilton v. Wheeling
Public Service Co., 88 W. Va. 573, 107 S. E. 401, 21 A. L. R. 433 (1921).
'Bledsoe v. Nixon, 69 N. C. 89, 12 Am. Rep. 642 (1873). Contra: Blanch-
ard v. Dominion N. Bank, supra note 35. For collection of decisions pro and
con, see 1 SE GwIcx, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) §345, note 546 and 547, and Note
(1923) 27 A. L. R. 81 et seq.
'Ellis v. Sullivan, 241 Mass. 60, 134 N. E. 695 (1922).
"Arnold v. Maxwell, 230 Mass. 441, 119 N. E. 776 (1918); Silver King
Coalition Mines Co. v. S. K. Consol. Mining Co., 122 C. C. A. 402, 204 Fed.
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5. Degree of Certainty of Amount of Principal Claim as Affecting
Allowance of Interest as Damages. (1) Where Amount is
"Liquidated!"
Little or no difficulty is encountered by the courts, except when
restrained by statute, in allowing interest as damages for the breach
of an obligation to pay a sum of money whose exact amount is fixed
and known. Such an amount is termed a liquidated sum. Interest,
as a rule is payable for the detention of such a liquidated sum whether
the duty to pay springs from a promise, or is one which is imposed
by law apart from contract.43 This has been based upon the view
that one who has had the use of money owing to another should in
justice make compensation for its wrongful detention.44 Conse-
quently, where one violates a promise to pay a definite sum at a time
named, interest is assessed from that time as damages for the
breach. 45 Moreover, an obligation to pay a fixed amount of money
imposed by law carries interest. 4 6 Thus, where one wrongfully de-
tains money which has been paid to him by mistake,4 7 or through a
diversion of the funds of a principal to the payment of the individual
debt of an agent,48 or wrongfully detains money received as a stake-
holder 49-in all these cases interest as damages will be added. A
railway which collects more than its lawful charges must restore the
excess with interest,50 and a mortgage creditor who sells the mort-
gaged property for more than enough to pay the debt, is obliged to
166, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 571 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913) ; Church v. Church, 122 Me.
459, 120 Atl. 428 (1923).
Cochrane v. Forbes, 166 N. E. 752 (Mass. 1929) (interest allowed from
date of demand for return of money paid by plaintiff to defendant for oil
purchased but not delivered because of exhaustion of well).
"Miller v. Robertson, 266 U. S. 243, 257, 45 Sup. Ct. 73, 69 L. ed. 265
(1924) ("One who has had the use of money owed to another justly may be
required to pay interest from the time the payment should have been made.
Both in law and in equity, interest is allowed on money due.").
"3 WiLLisrO , CoNTRAcTS (1922) §1413, note 41; for examples of numer-
ous statutory codifications of this rule, see GEORGiA ANNt. CODE (Michie,
1926) §3434 ("all liquidated demands, where by agreement or otherwise, the
sum to be paid is fixed or certain, bear interest from the time the party is bound
to pay them . . .") ; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) c. 51, §7036 ("any legal in-
debtedness").
'3 WLiLSToN, CONTRAcTS (1922) §1415, and cases cited under the remain-
ing notes to the present section herein.
"U. S. v. Skinner & Eddy Corp., 28 F. (2d) 373 (W. D. Wash. 1928).
" Napoleon Hill Cotton Co. v. Stix, Baer & Fuller D. G. Co., 203 Mo. App.
25, 217 S. W. 323 (1924) ; McMillan v. Nat'l Wool Warehouse & Storage Co.,
28 F. (2d) 793 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
" Kishi v. Humble Oil Co., supra note 1.
'Wabash Ry. Co. v. Koenig, 274 Fed. 909 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) certiorari
denied 257 U. S. 660, 42 Sup. Ct. 186, 66 L. ed. 422 (1921).
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pay over the surplus to the debtor, with interest.0 1 Similarly, claims
for sums of money embezzled or converted,52 or procured to be paid
by false representations 53 will properly include interest. The signif-
icance of the fact that the sum claimed is definite is exemplified by a
recent New York decision 54 in which an attorney who sued for his
disbursements and for the reasonable value of his services was al-
lowed interest on the amount of the disbursements but not on the
amounts allowed for services, the former being definitely ascertained,
and the latter not measurable by any certain, accepted standard.
While, as stated above, there is general agreement in the Ameri-
can decisions on the doctrine that a liquidated demand for money
bears interest from the time it becomes due, the statement does not
reflect complete accord in the actual results of the cases, for the courts
are by no means equally so harmonious in their definitions of the
term "liquidated."'5 5 Doubtless all courts would agree that a specific
sum of money named in and covenanted to be paid by an express con-
tract, where the liability to pay the principal sum is undisputed, is a
"liquidated" sum. Such admitted claims rarely give rise to any con-
' Meade v. Churchill, 100 Ore. 701, 197 Pac. 1078 (1921). Similarly, in
Oil-belt Motor Co. v. Hinton, 11 S. W. (2d).338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) where
one who returned his automobile to the dealer for re-sale to pay the amount
due was entitled to part of the surplus, it was held that he should recover in-
terest on his portion, from the time of the resale.
' New York Cloak & Suit House v. Coston, 270 Pac. 695 (Cal. App. 1928);
Baillie v. Columbia Gold M. Co., 86 Ore. 1, 166 Pac. 965, rehearing denied, 167
Pac. 1167 (1917); Lutz v. Williams, 84 W. Va. 216, 99 S. E. 440 (1919);
compare Kies v. Wilkinson, 114 Wash. 89, 194 Pac. 582, 12 A. L. R. 833
(1921) where interest was allowed on claim for unlawful preferential with-
drawal of money from an insolvent bank. DEcENNxiA DIGESTS, title "Inter-
est," key no. 12.
' Shriver v. Union Stock-yards Co., 117 Kan. 638, 232 Pac. 1062 (1925).
Compare Citizens' Bank v. Singer, 109 Okla. 27, 234 Pac. 708 (1925) where
interest was allowed against a bank which, after informing, the plaintiff that
a check offered to him was good, refused to pay it.
"Dykman v. City of New York, 183 App. Div. 859, 171 N. Y. Supp. 370
(1918).
"Broadly speaking, it is generally held that interest on unliquidated de-
mands will not be allowed as damages. Undoubtedly there is a clear distinction
between a claim for damages entirely unliquidated, as, for example, claims
for damages arising from assault and battery, from "seduction, or from slander
and libel, which are wholly at large, and a liquidated claim, where there is an
express contract to pay a sum certain at a fixed time. In the former cases,
the amount of damages is unknown until determined after the presentation of
evidence by a decision, award, or verdict. In the contract case, both parties
know what the claim is, and when it is due and payable. It is in dealing with
cases lying between these extremes, where the distinction is less clear and
obvious, that courts have so differed in their interpretation and application of
the rule as to interest that their decisions are far from harmonious as to when
interest may be allowed," Pearson v. Ryan, 42 R. I. 83, 105 At. 513, 3 A. L. R.
805 (1919).
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troversy over interest. Is the claim for such a sum still a "liq-
uidated" demand, where the defendant denies all liability under the
contract, or disputes liability for certain items and admits others?
It would seem that the existence of a dispute, over the whole or part
of the claim should not change the character of the claim from one
for a liquidated, to one for an unliquidated sum, and this conclusion
finds support in the cases.56 Other decisions have rejected this view,
however, and would hold that if the defendant in good faith denies
liability for all or part of the claim, that the claim then becomes unliq-
uidated, and interest can not be assessed on the basis that it is a
liquidated demand. 57 The same question, of course, arises in con-
nection with any claims whether resting upon contract, tort, or quasi-
contract, which have for their basis allegations that money has ac-
'In McCornack v. Sharples, 254 Pa. 541, 99 Atl. 155 (1916) the plaintiff
sought recovery of royalties agreed to be paid by defendant, the licensee under
certain patents. Defendant refused payment because he claimed that plaintiff
had agreed to assign the patents to him. The lower court found that de-
fendant must pay the royalties but should not be required to pay interest
thereon. The Supreme Court said, "Interest upon the royalties was, however,
denied, upon the ground that the controversy was over an honest difference of
opinion, and that the refusal to pay was in good faith. We cannot agree that
this was a sufficient reason. 'A bona fide dispute as to the amount of indebted-
ness is no bar to the accruing' of interest.' . . It is a sound principle, equally
applicable in equity or at law, that one who retains money, after it is justly
due and payable to another should pay interest f~r the detention. We are
therefore of opinion that McCornack was entitled to interest upon the royalties
retained by Sharples after they were due, and that the referee was not justified
in withholding it."
Likewise, in Pearson v. Ryan, supra note 51, the plaintiff, a contractor,
sued defendant for the unpaid balance of an amount agreed to be paid upon the
completion of a house for defendant. Defendant admitted the contract and
the completion of the house but asserted that he was entitled to have the re-
covery reduced because of unsatisfactory work and materials. This was dis-
puted, but the court below allowed the reduction, but also allowed interest on the
balance found to be recoverable. Defendant appealed from the allowance of
interest. The decree was affirmed, and the opinion recites: "This is clearly a.
liquidated claim under the rule." Similarly in Smith Brothers & Cooper v.
Hanson, 106 Kan. 32, 187 Pac. 262, 265 (1920) the court said: "We do not
concur in the view that the denial of liability, however vigorously made, ren-
ders a contract debtor immune from the payment of interest, even in the absence
of an affirmative finding of bad faith. The question of good faith becomes a
test in some situations, as where an account is to be settled or cross-denials
are to be adjusted. But when the question is simply whether at a given time a
debt for a fixed amount was owing, and this is decided in the affirmative, the
obligation to pay interest follows as a matter of course." Cases on the ques-
tion are collected in DECENNrAL DIGESTS, "Interest," §19 (3).
" See, for example, Baker County v. Huntington, 48 Ore. 593, 603, 89 Pac.
144 (on rehearing) (1907). In that case action was brought for defalcations
of a sheriff, against the sureties on his bond, who admitted the amount of the
defalcations but contested their liability therefor on the bond. Interest was not
allowed and the court said on appeal: "When the right to recover in an action
is in good faith denied, interest will not be allowed on the demand, prior to its
liquidation by the judgment."
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tually been received or dealt with under such circumstances that a
definite sum is due to the plaintiff. In these cases also the sum is
still "liquidated" according to what is believed to be the better view,
although the sum is not fixed by agreement and although the facts
upon which the claim is based may be disputed, and even though the
adversary successfully challenges the amount, and succeeds in re-
ducing it.58
Under this view, only those claims would be termed "unliq-
uidated" where the exact amount of the sum to be allowed can not
be definitely fixed from the facts proved, disputed or undisputed, but
must in the last analysis depend upon the opinion or discretion of the
judge or jury as to whether a larger or a smaller amount should be
allowed. If this be so, a claim for the full amount of a note for
$1000 is "liquidated" though the defendant claims, and the evidence
is in dispute on such defence, that he has paid half this sum. So
also a claim for $1000 alleged to have been in small amounts at dif-
ferent times embezzled by a bank cashier should be considered "liq-
uidated" though the fact and amount of each separate taking is dis-
puted. In short, it is the character of the claim and not of the defence
that is determinative of the question whether an amount of money
sued for, is a "liquidated sum."
It follows from the foregoing that where the amount sued for
may be arrived at by a process of measurement or computation from
the data given by the proof, without any reliance upon opinion or
discretion after the concrete facts have been determined, the amount
is liquidated and will bear interest.59
I Compare Pearson v. Ryan, supra note 52.
Thus, in Becker v. New York, 77 App. Div. 635, 78 N. Y. Supp. 1064
(1902) modified on other grounds, 176 N. Y. 441, 68 N. E. 855. it was held
that a claim for compensation for a certain number of cubic yards of excava-
tion under a contract fixing the price per cubic yard was liquidated, and interest
could properly be allowed. Cases involving the allowance of interest where
the amount due is ascertainable by compensation are collected in DECENNIAL
DIGESTS, "Interest," §19 (2). In Smith Brothers & Cooper v. Hanson, supra
note 54, the amount to be recovered depended upon the facts as to the number
of tons in a certain quantity of hay sold by defendant to plaintiff, as to which
plaintiff claimed he had made an over-payment according to the agreed method
of estimating the weight. The facts were in dispute, but as stated above, in-
terest on the amount found to be the overpayment was allowed. Compare Miller
v. Robertson, 266 U. S. 243, 45 Sup. Ct. 73, 69 L. ed. 265 (1924) where a buyer
refused to accept ore, and the seller sued for the difference between the con-
tract price and the lesser price obtained when the seller re-sold the ore after
the buyer's refusal. The Supreme Court held the claim was a "debt" and said
the lower court properly allowed interest, but intimated that it was within its
discretion. A somewhat similar action by a seller in which interest was at-
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In this country, though not in England,60 interest upon debts and
liquidated claims generally, is allowed as a matter of right and is not
dependent upon the discretion of judge or jury.61
While the authorities are not in concord, the better view seems to
be that interest upon stipulated or liquidated damages will be allowed
from the time of the accrual of the claim for stipulated damages. 62
6. Certainty of Amount. (2) Where Amount Is Not "Liquidated"
But Is Based on Valuation of Property or Services Having Pecu-
niary Value.
The next previous section has- dealt with the situation where,
when the physical facts, however disputed, are finally ascertained,
there is then no possible room for disagreement as to the exact sum
due. In such cases interest is customarily allowed. Differing from
these cases only slightly in degree of certainty, are the numerous
situations where the amount to be awarded, when all the concrete
facts are ascertained depends only upon the judge or jury's opinion
in the light of the evidence, as to the pecuniary value, ascertained by
market prices or current standards, of property or services. Within
this field are included claims for the destruction or other conversion
of personal property, which of course entitle the person injured to the
value of the property at the time of the wrong. In the same class are
cases where the plaintiff sues for the reasonable value of goods or
services which the defendant has the duty to pay for by reason of a
contract wherein the price was not named, or by reason of having
received the benefit of the same under circumstances which give
rise to a quasi-contractual duty to pay their value. Other instances
where the law measures the award by market or current values of
lowed as a matter of law is Central Oil Co. v. So. Ref. Co., 154 Cal. 165, 97
Pac. 177 (1908).
' See the statute cited in note 24, supra.
'" State v. Lott, 69 Ala. 147, 155 (1881), "Whenever it is ascertained that at
a particular time money ought to have been paid, whether in satisfaction of a
debt, or as compensation for a breach of duty, or for the failure to keep a
contract, interest attaches as an incident." Sanderson v. Trump Mfg. Co., 180
Ind. 197, 102 N. E. 2 (1913) (interest as damages recoverable as of right,
upon balance of price due to seller from buyer); Reading & P. R. Co. v.
Balthasar, 126 Pa. 1, 17 Atl. 518 (1889) "The learned judge said to the jury:
'After you have ascertained that there is any damage you will allow interest on
that sum from May 19, 1885 to the present time.' This would have been an
appropriate direction in an action ex contractu, because interest is a legal inci-
dent of a debt, but is not justifiable in an action of trespass.") ; McCall Co. v.
Icks, 107 Wis. 232, 83 N. W. 300 (1900).
" Chicago & S. E. Ry. Co. v. McEwen, 35 Ind. App. 251, 71 N. E. 926
(1904) ; 17 C. J. 967, 968 notes 60 and 61.
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property or services are varied and numerous. Where this is so,
while the person who is charged with the duty of paying this valu-
ation could probably not have known when the duty to pay arose,
with entire exactness, the precise figure at which the value would be
fixed, he could have estimated it within a narrow range of possible
variation. 3 It seems fair and equitable, therefore, to require him to
pay interest on the sum found to be due from the time when the duty
to make compensation arose, and the view which gives interest as a
matter of right in such cases seems to be gaining ground in recent
years. In 1918 the New York Court of Appeals thus described the
growth of the law on this subject: "The rule on this subject has been
in evolution. Today, however, it may be said that if a claim for dam-
ages represents a pecuniary loss, which may be ascertained with rea-
sonable certainty as of a fixed day, then interest is allowed from that
day. The test is not whether the demand is liquidated. Was the
plaintiff entitled to a certain sum? Should the defendant have paid
it? Could the latter have determined what was due, either by compu-
'As to how definite and precise the value must be, see Laycock v. Parker,
103 Wis. 161, 79 N. W. 327 (1899) where in the course of a discriminating
opinion by Dodge, J., the court said: "As would be expected, courts have varied
greatly in applying these rules to individual cases; but it may be safely said
that the tendency has been in favor of allowing interest rather than against it,
and that the degree of certainty or ease with which the approximate amount
can be ascertained has grown less and less stringent .... The true principle,
which is based on the sense of justice in the business community and on our
statute, is that he who retains money which he ought to pay to another should
be charged interest upon it. The difficulty is that it cannot well be said one
ought to pay money, unless he can ascertain how much he ought to pay with
reasonable exactness. Mere difference of opinion as to amount is, however,
no more a reason to excuse him from interest than difference of opinion,
whether he legally ought to pay at all, which has never been held an excuse.
When one is held liable, say, on a promissory note, to which his defense has
raised a doubtful question of law, he must pay the interest with it, because,
theoretically at least, there was a fixed standard of legal obligation, which, if
correctly applied, would have made his duty clear. So, if there be a reason-
ably certain standard of measurement by the correct application of which one
can ascertain the amount he owes, he should equally be held responsible for
making such application correctly and liable for interest if he does not. The
New York courts have adopted as designation of such a standard 'market
value,' and in a broad use of the term this is perhaps the safest test to apply.
It must, not however, be restrained to definite quotations on a board of trade,
or to such degree of certainty that no difference of opinion could exist. If
one having a commodity to purchase or certain services to hire can by inquiry
among those familiar with the subject learn approximately the current prices
which he would have to pay therefor, a market value can well be said to exist,
so that no serious inequity will result from the application of the foregoing
rule to those who desire to act justly; especially in view of the other rule of
law that a debtor can always stop interest by making and keeping good an
unconditional tender, thus giving him a substantial advantage over a creditor,
who has no such option."'
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tations alone or by computation in connection with established market
values, or other generally recognized standards ?"64
Thus, an early case65 from that state was an action brought by
one of the old patroons for failure by a tenant to pay rent in the form
of "eighteen bushels of wheat, four fat hens, and one day's service
with carriage and horses," and a verdict was directed for the value of
the goods and services with interest from the due dates. On appeal
this was approved and the court said: "Whenever a debtor is in de-
fault for not paying money, delivering property, or rendering serv-
ices in pursuance of his contract, justice requires that he should in-
demnify the creditor for the wrong which has been done him; and a
just indemnity, though it may sometimes be more, can never be less,
than the specified amount of money, or the value of the property or
services at the time they should have been paid or rendered, with in-
terest from the time of the default until the obligation is discharged."
Courts adopting this view have allowed interest in an action
against a contractor for failure to complete, upon the additional cost
to the owner of completing the work66 and upon the amount found
due where the action is upon a contract for the sale or delivery of
goods having an established market value, and the claim is for the
value of goods- paid for and not delivered, 7 or where payment has
not been made for the difference between the agreed price and the
value.68 Similarly one who sues upon quantum meruit for the value
of services rendered, would under this view be entitled to interest as
of right from the time payment for the services should have been
made, provided the services are such as have a standard current rate
of pay, as in case of laborers, clerks, or factory operatives, but not
where the services are of a unique or unusual character for which no
'Faber v. City of New York, 222 N. Y. 255, 118 N. E. 609, 611 (1918)
(interest on additional compensation due to contractor for excavations not
shown in the contract plan, not allowed, where no current established rates
for such work).
"Van Rensselaer v. Jewett, 2 N. Y. 141 (1849).
*'Horseshoe Lake Drainage Dist. v. Fred M. Crane Co., 112 Neb. 323, 199
N. W. 526 (1924).
"Andrews v. Clark, 72 Md. 396, 20 Atl. 429 (1890) ; 1 SExXVWIcK, DAMAGES
(9th ed. 1920) §313a. Compare State Trust & Svgs. Bank v. Hermosa Co.,
30 N. M. 566, 240 Pac. 469 (1925) where interest was allowed to purchaser on
damages for shortage of cattle sold.
'Thomas v. Wells, 140' Mass. 517, 5 N. E. 485 (1886). Compare Spencer
Kellogg & Sons v. Providence Churning Co., 45 R. I. 180, 121 Atl. 123 (1923)
refusing to disturb jury's allowance of interest against purchaser who fails to
accept the goods and carry out the purchase.
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customary standard of charges has found acceptance, as in case of
certain services of lawyers and doctors.6 9
These courts likewise take the same stand with reference to
claims sounding in tort, for the value of property converted or de-
stroyed,70 or for the diminution in value of property injured 71 by
defendant's wrong-that is, interest is allowed as of right from the
time when compensation ought to have been made (generally the time
of the wrong), if the values destroyed are ascertainable with refer-
ence to known market prices.
Nevertheless, there remains strongly entrenched in many jurisdic-
tions a reluctance to extend the allowance of interest as a matter of
right beyond the traditional boundary of liquidated claims. This
reluctance may be a survival of the general attitude of semi-religious
disfavor toward interest, which as has been seen, has its roots deep
in the soil of history. The result is a compromise. Most courts
Gearhart v. Hyde, 39 S. D. 273, 164 N. W. 58 (1917) (medical services,
interest denied); Dykman v. City of New York, 183 App. Div. 859, 171 N. Y.
Supp. 370 (1918) (legal services, interest denied). Compare Thomas v. Pied-
mont Realty Co., 195 N. C. 591, 143 S. E. 144 (1928), allowing interest as a
matter of right upon a real estate broker's claim for the reasonable value of
his services.
"Frazer v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 141 Mass. 126, 4 N. E. 620 (1866) ; Howell
v. Lehigh V. Ry. Co., 94 N. J. L. 213, 109 Atl. 309 (1920) (Interest allowed on
value of sugar destroyed by fire caused by defendant's negligent failure to
guard explosives. The court said: "The market value was 5% cents a pound,
and therefore the exact loss was ascertainable by mere computation. To il-
lustrate: If a quantity of that sugar had been sold on that day to a customer,
but without a price fixed therefor, there can be no doubt that in an action to
recover for the value of the sugar, even though the price and quantity delivered
be disputed by the defendant, the plaintiff would nevertheless be entitled to
recover its market value at the time the sugar was sold and found to have
been delivered, and, unless sold on credit, would be entitled to interest from
the date of the shipment. It is to be observed that in such a case, as was done
in the present, not only the value of the sugar would have to be ascertained by
reference to established market values, :but also the quantity actually delivered,
in order to ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff. There can, therefore,
be no rational basis on which the allowance of interest may be made in the one
case and not in the other."); Sayre v. Detroit G. H. & M. Ry. Co.. 205 Mich.
294, 171 N. W. 502 (1919); Pittsburgh etc. Gas Co. v. Pentiers Gas Co., 84
W. Va. 449, 100 S. E. 296 (1919). See 1 S DGwxcK, DAMAGES (9th ed., 1920)
§§316-320; DEcENNIAL DIGESTS, "Interest" §19, "Damages" §69, and "Trover"
§53. Where the doctrine of highest intermediate value is applied, interest
should not be allowed. See CALIF. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1923) §3336.
" Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114, 115 N. W. 497, 118 N. W. 36,
18 L. R A. (N. s.) 736 (1908) (damage to land by removal of support) ; Inde-
pendent Five & Ten Cent Stores v. Heller, 189 Ind. 554, 127 N. E. 439 (1920)
(interest as of right allowed upon amount of damages to property of lessee of
upper floor due to collapse of building) ; Smith v. Waterbury Co., 99 Conn.
446, 121 AtI. 873 (1923) (where automobile damaged by collision due to de-
fendant's negligence, interest allowed on amount necessary to repair the auto-
mobile).
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which deny interest as a matter of right where the amount due is not
liquidated but is ascertainable by reference to established market val-
ues, will nevertheless permit the jury in its discretion to award inter-
est as a matter of grace. As will be seen, a rule might be defended
which would permit a jury to disallow interest in such cases for any
period of delay caused by plaintiff's own fault. A rule, however,
which leaves the award of this important element of compensation
to the unbridled caprice of the jury, in cases where a fairly measur-
able sum has been withheld from plaintiff, seems hard to support. It
lends encouragement to that tendency of jurors to preserve a specious
semblance of fairness by conceding something to each side, though
the right is all on one side. Nevertheless, numerous courts hold that
even though the amount recoverable is fixed by established market
values, the jury has a discretion to withhold or allow interest
thereon. This practice finds wide acceptance in actions both for
breach of contract,72 and in tort,73 especially for conversion or de-
struction of personal property, 74 or for injury to real7 5 or personal7 e
property.
Interest as damages is sometimes awarded for the loss of the use
of land or chattels where the plaintiff has been wrongfully deprived
of the use of his property for a period but not permanently. Here
interest on the value of the property for the period of deprivation
may be given as a substitute for an attempt to measure the rental
value or the value of the use of the property.
77
" Chicago Ry. Equipment Co. v. Superior Iron Co., 12 F. (2d) 235 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1926) (interest on damages for buyer's repudiation of contract to pur-
chase pig iron in installments) ; Bucher v. Fed. Baseball Club, 130 Md. 635,
101 Atl. 534 (1917); Ben Cheeseman Realty Co. v. Thompson, 112 So. 151
(Ala., 1927).
" United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 169 C. C. A. 549, 258 Fed.
829, 846 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919) reversed on other grounds, 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup.
Ct. 570, 66 L. ed. 975, 27 A. L. R. 762 (1921).
" Asadorian v. Sayman, 233 S. W. 467 (Mo., 1921) (applying Mo. REv.
STAT. (1919) §4222) ; White v. Riddle, 198 N. C. 511, 152 S. E. 501 (1930) ;
Royal Insurance Co. v. Atl. C. L. Ry. Co., 198 N. C. 518, 152 S. E. 503 (1930)
(negligent destruction of cotton by fire); Western & A. Ry. Co. v. Calhoun,
104 Ga. 384, 30 S. E. 868 (1898) (negligent killing of horse).
" Knight v. Sullivan Power Co., 140 S. C. 296, 138 S. E. 818 (1927)
(damage to upper land caused by construction of dam).
78L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Faust, 30 Ga. App. 310, 117 S. E. 761 (1923) (dam-
age to automobile struck by train) ; Wilson v. City of Troy, 135 N. Y. 96, 32
N. E. 44, 18 L. R. A. 449, 31 Am. St. Rep. 817 (1892) (damage- to horse).
" Cincinnati & C. Traction Co. v. American Bridge Co., 120, C. C. A. 398,
202 Fed. 184 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913) ; Schulte v. Tomsville & N. R. Co., 128 Ky.
627, 108 S. W. 941 (1908).
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7. Certainty of Amount. (3) Where the Sum Claimed Is Neither
"Liquidated" Nor Based on a Standardized Valuation, But Yet
Is Pecuniary in Its Nature.
There is a class of claims next in the descending scale of exact-
ness of ascertainability of amount, where the compensation to be re-
covered is subject to a wide range of variation. Judicious men would
be likely to give, upon the same evidence, quite different estimates
of the proper amount of damage to be allowed. Nevertheless, the
situations are such that it is fairly clear that at a given time the claim-
ant has suffered a distinct and measurable financial loss. It is rea-
sonably certain either that his estate has been diminished or that he
has wrongfully been prevented from securing a profit which would
have increased it. Should he for delay in receiving this compen-
sation be additionally compensated by allowing interest upon the
claim? The earlier judges with their distaste for interest upon un-
liquidated claims where the debtor cannot know the precise sum which
the law will exact, frowned upon interest in this class of claims, but
the marked tendency today is toward the allowance of interest in such
cases. Following out the characteristic evolution of the rules giving
interest as damages, the courts have in the main gone only so far as
to permit the jury (or the judge where he is sitting without a jury)
to grant interest in their discretion, in cases of this type.78 Observe,
however, the limitation-the damage upon which interest is sought
must be given for an injury to the plaintiff's pecuniary interests-to
his pocket-book, rather than his feelings.
"Language often cited in the recent opinions is the dictum of Butler, J., in
Miller v. Robertson, 266 U. S. 243, 258, 45 Sup. Ct. 73, 69 L. ed. 265 (1924) :
"Generally interest is not allowed upon unliquidated damages. Mowry v.
Whitney, 14 Wall. 620, 653, 20 L. ed. 860 (1871). But when necessary in order
to arrive at fair compensation, the court in the exercise of a fair discretion
may include interest or its equivalent as an element of damages."
THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs by the American Law Insti-
tute, tentative draft number 8, §328, is as follows: "If the parties have not by
contract determined otherwise, simple interest at the statutory legal rate is
recoverable as damages for breach of contract as follows:
(a) Where the defendant commits a breach of a contract to pay a definite
sum of money, or to render a performance the value of which in money is
stated in the contract or is ascertainable by mathematical calculation from a
standard fixed in the contract or from established market prices of the subject
matter, interest is allowed on the amount of the debt or money value from the
time performance was due, after making all the deductions to which the de-
fendant may be entitled.
(b) Where the contract that is broken is of a kind not specified in Clause
(a), interest may be allowed in the discretion of the court, if justice clearly
requires it, on the amount that the court finds would have been just compen-
sation if it had been paid when performance was due."
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In nearly all actions for breach of contract, except for breach of
contract of marriage, the claim is for injury to these interests of sub-
stance, rather than of personality, and examples of the discretionary
allowance of interest in contract cases upon claims for compensation
of a rather contingent sort illustrate the tendency mentioned above.
Thus, while we find a case 79 in 1879 by a court unusually liberal in
its attitude on interest, denying interest upon a claim for breach of
warranty of cabbage seed based upon the difference in value of the
crop raised and what would have been raised if the seeds had been
as warranted, yet a recent decision80 of a Circuit Court of Appeals
approved an instruction which permitted the jury to give in its dis-
cretion, interest upon a claim for lost profits for breach of a contract
to furnish an adequate purifying system to an oil refinery. Even
more striking is another recent decision8 l of the same court in a case
where the plaintiff, a manufacturer of rubber heels, sought damages
for breach of warranty for defendant's delivering oil to be used as a
stiffening material in making the rubber composition, which oil was
unsuitable and rendered defective the heels made from it. Not only
did the compensation awarded include damages for the lessened value
of the heels manufactured, but it included damage to plaintiff's good
will. Such latter recovery was necessarily based upon estimate and
approximation. Nevertheless, the court approved the action of the
trial judge in awarding interest from the beginning of the suit as a
proper exercise of discretion, upon the damages awarded.
In the realm of torts, and particularly in cases arising from per-
sonal injuries, claims for injury to interests of substance, such as loss
of earning power, are frequently part of the same cause of action
with claims for injury to interests of personality, such as mental suf-
fering and physical pain. Consequently, courts have usually sum-
madly discountenanced interest in all personal injury cases.8 2 This
"White v. Miller, 78 N. Y. 393, 34 Am. St. Rep. 544 (1879); CRANE,
CASES ON DAMAGES (1928) 310. A similar conservative attitude is sometimes
found in current decisions, see, for example, Wyoming Cent. Irr. Co. v. Laport,
26 Wyo. 249, 182 Pac. 485 (1919) ; Gt. No. Ry. Co. v. Phila. & R. Coal Co.,
242 Fed. 799 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917).
"Gasoline Products Co., Inc. v. Champlin Refining Co., 39 F. (2d) 521
(C C. A. 1st, 1930). Compare Gen. Motors Truck Co. v. Shepard Co., 47
R. I. 88, 129 Atl. 825 (1925), on rehearing, 47 R. I. 153, 130 AtI. 593 (1925).
'Barrett Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg. Co., 24 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 1st,
1928). While this suit was brought in equity, to set aside a fraudulent convey-
ance, the claim for damages was of course a legal rather than an equitable
one.
'Burrows v. Townsdale, 133 Fed. 250 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904) ; Western etc.
Ry. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga. 397, 7 S. E. 912, 12 Am. St. Rep. 320 (1888) ; Staley
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generalization (like so many dicta about interest, thrown off hur-
riedly as relating to a minor feature of the case) is hasty and in-
judicious. It seems clearly desirable that the jury should at least be
permitted, if not required, to add interest as compensation for delay
in payment of those purely pecuniary losses which result from an
injury to the person. Expenditures for doctor's and nurses' bills and
other necessary charges, would come within the classes above of
claims liquidated, or those based upon customary valuations of serv-
ices, and interest should be added as of right.88 Rather more difficult
questions arise as to compensation for loss of earning power. Here
the loss is purely pecuniary and is based upon reasoned calculations
as to earnings. In a case where the plaintiff has recovered from the
disability, loss of past earnings certainly seems ascertainable with
sufficient definiteness to form the basis of an award of interest.
8 4 So
also in actions for death injuries in so far as the claim under the par-
ticular statute is based upon the financial value to the deceased, or
to his dependents, of the period by which his life has been curtailed,
the loss again is pecuniary and is not "at large" but is 'based on cal-
culation and estimate, subject as these may be to many factors of
error. Interest from the time of death should be within the jury's
discretion, but the decisions are in conflict.8 5 The problem is more
complex where the action for personal injuries is brought by a plain-
tiff who has suffered injury which not only has disabled him in the
past but will disable him in the future. In such cases the recovery is
assessed, not on the basis of the loss capitalized at the time of the
injury (as in death cases) but on the basis of the facts as they appear
at the time of trial.86 That is, plaintiff recovers for past loss of
earnings plus his probable future loss of earnings. Obviously, it
v. Forest, 157 Iowa 188, 138 N. W. 441 (1912); Cochran v. Boston, 211 Mass.
171, 97 N. E. 1100, 39 L. R. A. (x. s.) 120, Ann. Cas. 1913 B 206 (1912) ;
Penny v. A. C. L. Ry. Co., 161 N. C. 523, 77 S. E. 774, Ann. Cas. 1914 D 992
(1913). In Conover v. Bloom, 269 Pa. 548, 112 Atl. 752 (1921) a distinction
was taken between the damages for personal injury and those to plaintiff's
automobile arising from the same accident, in respect to interest.
83Compare Washington etc. Ry. Co. v. Hickey, 12 App. (D. C.) 269 (1898)
where the jury was allowed to give interest in its discretion, upon such items
of damage.
See Bentz v. Johnson, 21 Pa. Dist. 1068.
"Interest is allowed, for example, in Ga. R. & Banking Co. v. Garr, 57 Ga.
277, 24 Am. St. Rep. 492 (1876) semble, and in Burns v. Eminger, 84 Mont.
397, 276 Pac. 437 (1929), but denied in Mobile & 0. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 219
Ala. 238, 121 So. 722 (1929) (under Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45
U. S. C. A. §§51-59). Cases are collected in DECENNIAL DIGESTS, "Death,"
§92." McGonnell v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 234 Pa. 396, 83 Atl. 282 (1912).
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would be error to allow interest for delay in paying the latter sum. 8 7
On the contrary, the recovery for loss of future earnings must be
reduced under the "present worth" doctrine8 because the judgment
requires them to be paid before the earnings would actually accrue.
If the future earnings are thus to be reduced because the prospect of
money to be paid in future is worth less than the same sum in hand,
by a parity of reasoning it would seem that interest should be allowed
for delay in reimbursing plaintiff for earnings which he should have,
but has not, received in the past. Doubtless, due to a fear that undue
complexity in instructions to juries and excessive intricacies of cal-
culation might be called for, courts have been slow thus to analyze
the damages in personal injury cases into their component parts and
authorize interest on some and not on others. Some of them have
approached the same result vaguely and indirectly by holding that
while interest as such is not allowable, nevertheless the jury may in
estimating the damages take into account the length of time since the
injury occurred.90 A few frankly and properly permit the jury in
their discretion to include "interest" in their verdict.9 '
8. Certainty. (4) Interest Not Allowed Upon Compensation for
Pain, Humiliation, Disgrace, and Other Injuries to Interests of
Personality.
The cases considered in the three previous sections have all been
claims for compensation for injuries to interests of substance. While
they differed in the degrees of certainty with which one could predict
the amounts by which the injuries would be measured by a court or
jury, nevertheless in each class of cases, the attempt was to measure
in terms of money an injury to the worldly estate of the claimant, and
some fairly understandable criteria could usually be found by which
to rationalize the measurement of the injury in money. In such cases,
it is usually a just and sensible procedure to allocate the injury to a
particular time and to add interest for the delay in securing payment
of the compensation. However, when we consider the remedy of
money-damages for injuries which have nothing to do with a man's
"estate," but concern his "mind" or "body," we are in a different
' See Duffy v. J. W. Bishop Co., 99 Conn. 573, 581, 122 At. 121, 124 (1923)."See §1, supra.
' Saliba v. Saliba, 178 Ark. 250, 11 S. W. (2d) 774, 61 A. L. R. 1348 (1928);
Blount v. Montpelier & W. R. Ry., 89 Vt. 152, 94 AtL. 106 (1915), semble.
"t Eli v. No. Pac. Ry. Co., I N. D. 336, 48 N. W. 222, 26 Am. St. Rep. 621, 12
L. R. A. 97 (1891) (under statute allowing interest "in an action for the breach
of an obligation not arising from a contract.").
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world. It is true that courts award money damages for pain, mental
suffering, humiliation, and disgrace, but the process of measurement
is in a sense an arbitrary one, in which the court or jury assessing
damages exercise a latitude and freedom different in kind from the
discretion allowed in the measurement of injuries of a pecuniary sort.
Where a jury considers, without any standards except a general
standard of reasonableness and restraint, the amount of money to be
awarded a plaintiff for the disgrace of being falsely accused of mur-
der, it would serve little purpose to give them specifically a further
discretion to add interest, where the figure to be arrived at is almost
wholly discretionary or "at large." Consequently, it is generally
agreed that juries should not be permitted to allow even as a matter
of discretion, interest upon damages given for pain, suffering, humil-
iation and other like non-pecuniary injuries 92 in actions for assault,
libel or slander, personal injuries, breach of promise of marriage,
seduction, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, or criminal con-
versation. 93 Similar considerations apply to exemplary damages 4
which are awarded not as compensation at all, but as punishment.
As suggested above in connection with claims for personal injuries,
whenever it is practical to segregate pecuniary from non-pecuniary
injuries in any of these cases, there would seem to be no objection in
permitting interest to be allowed on the damages for the former.
Even in cases where the damages are "at large" as in claims for
pain or disgrace, there would seem to be some argument for the
propriety of a discretion to give a somewhat greater sum at the end
of two years of seeking, than at the end of one. Whatever the nature
of the claim, a satisfaction by a payment of $1000 one year after
demand is worth more to the claimant than the same sum awarded
'12It is submitted that it is the character of the particular damage upon which
interest is sought, that should govern the allowance of interest and not the
character of the action, as being one of tort or contract. Where an action for
false imprisonment, for example, includes a claim for recovery of a sum of
money extorted from plaintiff by the restraint, interest should be allowed (as of
right, see note 46, 61, supra) on the money claim, although not upon accom-
panying claims for indignity and anguish. In Taylor v. Coolidge, 64 Vt. 506,
24 Atl. 656 (1892) this distinction was obscured. In that case, in an action for
false imprisonment under a void tax warrant the plaintiff sought recovery of
money extorted, and the court held it was error to instruct the jury that interest
on the money must be allowed, since in actions of tort interest is discretionary.
" See Regan v. N. Y. & N. E. Ry. Co., 60 Conn. 124, 22 Atl. 503, 25 Am. St.
Rep. 306 (1891) ; Wilson v. Troy, 135 N. Y. 96, 32 N. E. 44, 31 Am. St. Rep.
817, 18 L. R. A. 449 (1892).
" Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa 618, 126 N. W. 342, 132 N. W. 371,
36 L. R. A. (w. s.) 263 (1911).
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two years after demand. Interest is allowed after judgment on such
a claim. Why should not the amount of the later verdict be adjusted
to accord with the economic facts? The jury doubtless oftentimes
follows this reasoning without any instructions on interest or delay.
Consequently, it would seem that if the damages awarded in a case
where the damages are "at large'! are not excessive on other grounds,
appellate courts should not reverse because of an instruction permit-
ting the jury to allow interest as damages.
9. Faudt as a Factor in Determining Liability for Interest.
Law and morals are distinct, but close akin. Punishment for moral
Wrong is, according to the ideas of some jurists, an inseparable inci-
dent of the assessment of monetary damages. The kinship is illus-
trated by the doctrines concerning interest.95 If one has agreed to
pay interest he is liable because of his promise,9 6 and if he has re-
ceived interest on another's funds he is liable tb pay over such inter-
est 9 7 because otherwise he would be unjustly enriched. In all other
cases, however, which is to say in all cases where interest is sought
as damages, it must be based upon an unjustifiable withholding of
money due as a debt, or money recoverable as damages.98 Thus, if
the debtor is prevented from paying by an injunction,9 9 no interest
as damages runs during the period of prevention. If, however, pay-
,ment of the debt, or of the damages if the amount is reasonably cer-
tain, is withheld without lawful excuse, we have seen that interest is
generally allowed. Even in a state where the last generalization
could hardly be made because of the limitations of its interest statute,
the legislature has made it a distinct ground of liability for interest
that the claim is for "money withheld by an unreasonable and vex-
atious delay of payment." 10o  Furthermore it has been held, most
" The most striking example of this is seen in the provision of some of the
codes, e.g. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1923) §3288; N. D. ComP. LAws ANN.
(1913) §7143, that "in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may
be given in the discretion of the jury."
See section one, supra.
Bassett v. Kinney, 24 Conn. 267, 63 Am. Dec. 161 (1855).
'Dresser v. Bates, 250 Fed. 525 (C. C. A. 1st, 1918), decree modified 251
U. S. 524, 40 Sup. Ct. 247, 64 L. ed. 388 (1920); Capital City Lbr. Co. v.
Sndarsky, 95 Conn. 336, 111 Atl. 349 (1920).
"Ide v. Aetna Ins. Co., 232 Mass. 523, 122 N. E. 654 (1919) ; DCMNNIAL
DIGESTS "Interest," §52. However, if the debtor enjoined does not hold the
money idle and available to meet the payment, he may be charged with interest.
Agnew Co. v. Board of Education, 83 N. J. Eq. 49, 67, 89 At. 1046, 1054 (1914)
affirmed 83 N. J. Eq. 336, 90 Atl. 1135 (1914).
'ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 74, §2. See DECENNIAL DIGESTS "In-
terest," §14.
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equitably it would seem, that where the amount payable by a railway
to a contractor was so uncertain as not ordinarily to be the basis for
the allowance of interest, yet if this uncertainty was due to the fact
that defendant's engineer failed to make necessary measurements of
work done by the contractor, interest would be allowed. 101
On the other hand, if the plaintiff's own conduct has substantially
contributed to cause the delay in payment this may cause a denial of
interest. Consequently, if the debtor tenders the amount due to the
creditor who refuses to receive it, no further liability for interest
accrues.' 02 Likewise, where the plaintiff has demanded damages
which are grossly excessive and unreasonable as measured by the
amount later awarded in court,108 or where the plaintiff has declined
to accept' 04 a reasonable offer of settlement it has been held that the
plaintiff may not recover interest. There is force in the contention
that plaintiff should suffer for such over-grasping conduct, if we look
upon interest-damages solely as a punishment for a deterrent from
stubbornness or greed. If, however, such interest be looked upon as
compensation merely, the case is not so clear, for after all the plain-
tiff has lost and the defendant has gained by the withholding of pay-
ment, whoever was morally responsible for the delay. Similarly,
where the plaintiff has unduly delayed the prosecution of his princi-
pal claim, interest has sometimes been denied'0 5 though as suggested
.. McMahon v. N. Y. & E. R. Ry. Co. 20 N. Y. 463 (1859); Spalding v.
Mason, 161 U. S. 375, 395, 16 Sup. Ct. 592, 40 L. ed. 738 (1896) where the court
as a reason for allowing interest said: "He had in his possession and control
the means of determining the amount of such indebtedness, and as to an in-
debtedness which he ought not to have disputed he should have ascertained the
amount due and tendered it without prejudice to a dispute concerning other
items."
'Jones v. Kelly, 203 Ala. 170, 82 So. 420 (1919); DECENNIAL DIGESTS
"Interest," §50.
' Pierce v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 232 Pa. 170, 81 Atl. 142 (1911) (claim
of $50,000 for trespass, damage found by jury at $6,000, interest denied).
'Thompson v. Boston & M. R. Co., 58 N. H. 524 (1879) ; CRNaES CsaS
oN DAMAGES (1928) 316.
''White v. United States, 202 Fed. 501 (C. C. A. 5th, 1913). (Action for
conversion of timber, brought many years after the taking and tried thirteen
years after the wrong; held, jury erroneously permitted to allow interest, in
view of the "long and unexplained delay") ; Andrus v. Berkshire Power Co., 197
Fed. 1016 (D. C't, Conn. 1912) (Injunction sought against continuance of dam,
as trespass; when injunction denied, plaintiff appeals unsuccessfully; held,
plaintiff on now having damages assessed in equity for the trespass will be
denied interest thereon during the delay which was due to his appeal) ; Red-
field v. Ystalyfera Iron Co., 110 U. S. 174, 176, 3 Sup. Ct. 570, 28 L. ed. 109
(1884) (Plaintiff sues for customs duties illegally exacted, and claims interest.
"But where interest is recoverable, not as part of the contract, but by way of
damages, if the plaintiff has been guilty of laches in unreasonably delaying
the prosecution of his claim, it may be properly withheld.").
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above, such postponement of judgment seldom works anything but
benefit for the defendant. Probably no hard and fast rules should be
worked out as to the effect of plaintiffs' excessive demands, refusal
of offered settlements, or delay in prosecuting suit, and they should
only be considered in cases where interest is a matter of discretion,
to guide the court or jury in the exercise of that discretion.
10. Time From Which Interest as Damages Is Calculated.
While obviously contractual interest is often agreed to be paid
before the maturity of the principal debt, interest as damages can be
awarded only for default in paying money when due, or delay -in
making compensation for some tort or breach of contract or breach
of some other obligation.108 Necessarily, therefore it can be com-
puted for no period earlier than such default or breach,10 7 and when
the principal amount due by way of debt or compensation is suffi-
ciently certain under the standards discussed in previous sections, 08
the time when it should have been paid is the time from which inter-
est will be computed.' 0 9 Where two parties have had a series of deal-
ings in regular course of business in which one has furnished goods or
services to the other, with the expectation that statements covering
the prices to be paid will be furnished the debtor, the transaction is
often called an "account." The implied understanding may be that
the account will not be due, until a final and complete statement con-
stituting a formal demand is made, and meanwhile partial payments
in money, or in goods or services may be made from time to time.
During this period it is an "open" or "running" account and interest
for this period is not recoverable, 1 0 except when otherwise agreed
or when local statutes otherwise provide. A demand will mature such
an account and interest will run from demand,"' and if no previous
demand is made the commencement of the suit will constitute the
requisite demand, and interest will date from the beginning of suit.
" Thus, for example, no interest is allowed against a custodian who is right-
fully in possession of a fund until it shall be his duty to pay it over. Ice Y.
Kilworth, 84 Kan. 458, 114 Pac. 857, 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 220 (1911) ; 6 PAGE,
CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1922) §3210, note 5.
" "Interest, as a general, I might say, universal rule is never demandable
until money is due." Minard v. Beans, 64 Pa. 411 (1870).
See §§5, 6, 7, supra.'
' See cases cited in notes 62, 64, 69, supra.
'" Hallowell Granite Works v. Orleans, 144 La. 419, 80 So. 610 (1919);
cases cited in DECENNIAL DIGESTS, "Interest" §18 (2).
' Ledyard v. Bull, 119 N. Y. 62, 23 N. E. 444 (1890) ; Dempsey v. Scha-
wacker, 140 Mo. 680, 38 S. W. 954, 41 S. W. 1100 (1897); 1 SUTHERMAND,
DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) §349.
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Except as a demand thus maturing a claim payable on demand, there
seems to be no reason why the time of suit should be the starting
point for interest.
1 12
In some cases of accounts which are "mutual," that is, where each
side has numerous debits and credits, the implied agreement may be
that final payment shall be due only upon an examination of the
account by both parties and an agreement as to the balance owed.
A statement presented by one party and not objected to by the other
within a reasonable time constitutes such an agreement. 113 The ac-
count then becomes a "stated" or "liquidated" one and interest runs
from the time of its liquidation by the parties. 114  If no agreement
can be reached, interest does not begin until its liquidation by the
court in an action. In case of such an account, a mere demand would
not mature the obligation.
In any event, when a claim for a debt or damages is finally re-
duced to judgment, whether or not any interest has been recovered
and included in the amount of the judgment, the judgment itself as a
general rule 'bears interest from the date of the judgment. 115
11. Allowance of Interest as Damages in Equity.
In numerous instances courts in administering equity have occa-
sion to award compensation for the withholding of money, as in suits
for accounting, and to award unliquidated damages for injury to
property or breach of contract, as in suits for injunction and for
specific performance. In these and in many other types of cases in
equity, claims for interest as damages are often asserted. Usually
such courts "follow the law," in awarding interest as damages"o
' White v. Miller, 78 N. Y. 393, 34 Am. Rep. 544 (1879) ; CRANE CASES ON
DAMAGES, (1928) 310. But compare Childs v. Krey, 199 Mass. 352, 85 N. E.
442 (1908) where interest on an unliquidated counterclaim was allowed from the
time of the commencement of the suit.
' Henderson Cotton Mfg. Co. v. Lowell Mch. Shops, 86 Ky. 668, 7 S. W.
142 (1888).
'Ready v. George, 220 Mich. 217, 189 N. W. 869 (1922), Scott v. Reynolds,
163 N. C. 502, 79 S. E. 960 (1913) ; and cases collected in DECENNIAL DIGESTS,
"Interest," §18 (3).
'While judgments did not at common law always bear interest-see U. S.
v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., 254 Fed. 714 (D. N. D. 1918)-yet they usually
do by rule or statute to-day in most jurisdictions; as for example, see U. S. C.
A. Title 28, §811 which provides for interest on civil money judgments, and
see cases cited in DECENNIAL DIGESTS, "Interest," §22.
' Latrobe v. Winans, 89 Md. 636, 43 Atl. 829, 833 (1899) ; State Trust and
Savings Bank v. Hermosa Land & Cattle Co., 30 N. M. 566, 240 Pac. 469 (1925)
("There are numerous decisions to the effect that while equity generally looks
to the law for the rule of damages, it will not refuse interest on unliquidated
claims where justice requires its allowance") ; 4 SmDwxcic, DAMAGES (9th ed.,
1920, by Beale) §1256k.
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unless some reason appears for deviating from legal doctrines. The
practice at law of giving interest-damages has been liberalized, first
by extending the realm of the jury's discretion, and second (in
America) by converting what was allowable in their discretion to a
claim collectible as of right, by a rule of law.117 This tendency in
respect to claims at law to withdraw the matter from the jury's dis-
cretion is probably wholesome, because an untrained body is not
likely to exercise such a discretion very wisely or very consistently
with results reached by other juries. In equity, however, even where
as in England and most states today the same courts administer both
law and equity, the judge sits usually without a jury and determines
the amount of the damages for himself."18 Consequently, the tend-
ency has always been for equity judges to allow or deny interest as
damages with more freedom and flexibility of adjustment to the in-
dividual case than in the common law courts, which tend to seek
general rules which they can prescribe for the guidance of juries. A
few examples will illustrate the methods with which equity has dealt
with the problem of interest as damages. In a suit for an accounting
between two railroads under a contract relating to their joint busi-
ness, the complainant claimed a sum in excess of $200,000 but the
court finally allowed recovery of only about $30,000. Interest was
not allowed from the time of the accrual of the latter sum because
of the complainant's delay and its failure to make a specific demand
before suit, but interest was allowed from the time when the suit was
filed and the court, after reviewing the history of the recovery of
interest in England and the Federal courts, said: "Indeed, in the
United States the active use of money is so general, the holding of
it as a special deposit, so that there is no increment, is so rare, that to
refuse a plaintiff or complainant interest on money unjustly detained
does ordinarily a double injury-it deprives him of the increase to
which he was justly entitled, and it violates, in behalf of the de-
fendant, a fundamental maxim of equity, by allowing him to take
advantage of his own wrong.""1
9
In a Maryland case the president of a corporation in violation of
the terms of a deed of trust securing bonds issued for the purpose of
See §§5 and 6, supra.
"' While he may refer the matter of damages to a jury or a master, the
judge is the final arbiter. See Mortgage Loan Co. v. Townsend, 156 S. C. 203,
152 S. E. 878 (1930).
=' Nashua & Lowell Ry. Corp. v. Boston & Lowell Ry. Corp., 61 Fed. 237,
251 (C. C. A. 1st, 1894).
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building a plant, expended some of the proceeds in payment of debts
of the corporation. Suit was brought by the receiver of the corpor-
ation to recover the money as a trust fund and the court allowed the
recovery but held that though interest is ordinarily allowable on sums
thus withheld, since here the defendants acted in good faith interest
would be denied. "The allowance of interest," the court said, "as a
general rule, is discretionary with the court in equity cases. They
may allow it or not according to the equity and justice between the
parties, except in cases where interest is recoverable as a matter of
right."12
0
A similar viewpoint is disclosed in cases where a court of equity
through its receivers is called upon to administer an estate and dis-
tribute it among creditors. Will interest be allowed as damages for
the time when the- estate is in the hands of the court? Ordinarily
no, but even here no hard and fast rule is announced. "In each case,"
according to a recent New Jersey decision, "the question is what is
fair in right and justice.' 121 Again, where the equity court is called
upon to make compensation for waste or trespass the plaintiff's delay
or the defendant's willful fault are likely to be given even more stress
than in actions at common law in determining whether interest upon
the damages will be included in the decree. 122 In suits for specific per-
formance of contracts for the sale of land, courts are often faced
with difficult problems where the conveyance, due to the fault of one
party or the other, or perhaps of neither, has been delayed beyond the
time fixed in the contract for completing the purchase. When the
vendor claims interest during the delay, upon the purchase money,
he may ordinarily recover it, unless he has continued in possession
and has received the rents and profits. He cannot have both. 123 All
in all, however, while equity cases present some special problems, and
are dealt with in more flexible and discretionary fashion than at law,
the difference in respect to interest is one of degree of procedural
freedom rather than any divergence of doctrine.
' Carrington v. Thomas C. Basshar Co., 119 Md. 378, 86 Atl. 1030, 1031
(1913).
' Hoover Steel Ball Co., v. Schaefer Ball Bearing Co., 90 N. 3. Eq. 515,
107 Atl. 425 (1919).
'Tate v. Field, 57 N. J. Eq. 53, 40 At. 206 (1898) (waste, in removing
building, highest estimated value allowed, with interest, against defendants as
willful wrongdoers) ; Andrus v. Berkshire Power Co., supra note 105 (trespass.
interest on damages, denied because of plaintiff's delay).
' See Minard v. Beans, 64 Pa. 411 (1870). As to the respective rights to
interest and rents and profits as between vendor and purchaser, see 2 CooK,
CASES IN EQUITY (1925) 627-645; 1 AmEs, CASFS IN EQUITY JURISDICTION
(1901-1904) 219, note.
